

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 PARIS 04252 01 OF 02 182104Z

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ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 IO-03 CIAE-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 SP-02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6770

INFO USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY ROME

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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

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AMEMBASSY OSLO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 04252

LIMDIS

NOFORN

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, XG, FR

SUBJECT: QUAI WORKING LEVEL LESS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT SUMMER

CSCE SUMMIT

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PAGE 02 PARIS 04252 01 OF 02 182104Z

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: QUAI WORKING LEVEL INCREASINGLY

PESSIMISTIC ABOUT CSCE WIND-UP THIS SUMMER, BUT BELIEVES TIME IS NOW WORKING AGAINST SOVIETS, AND EXPECTS SOME RESOLUTION OF ISSUES LEADING TO A PHASE THREE SUMMIT THIS FALL -- EVEN IF CBM ISSUE IS NOT SOLVED. PRINCIPAL PROBLEM WILL BE TO MAINTAIN ALLIED "COOL" AND COHESION DURING WIND-UP PHASE. END SUMMARY.

2. IN REVIEW CURRENT FRENCH ATTITUDES CSCE WITH EMBOFF, PIERRET, SENIOR MEMBER QUAI'S CSCE TECHNICAL STAFF, ADMITTED TO "SHARP" FRENCH DISAPPOINTMENT OVER FAILURE OF "SPIRIT OF RAMBOUILLET" TO CARRY OVER INTO INITIAL SOVIET POSITIONS AT RESUMED CSCE. AT THE VERY LEAST, HE SAID, INFLEXIBLE SOVIET STANCE ON KEY ISSUES HAS WASTED A MONTH'S TIME. AS A RESULT, EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE SOVIETS WILL INTRODUCE A MINIMUM PACKAGE OF TRADE-OFFS AT SOME POINT LATER THIS SPRING, THE QUAI IS NO LONGER QUITE AS SURE THAT PLANNING FOR A PHASE THREE SUMMIT THIS SUMMER IS STILL REALISTIC, ALTHOUGH, HE STRESSED, IT IS HOLDING TO THIS LINE IN ALL ITS OFFICIAL STATEMENTS. EMPHASIZING THAT HE WAS NOW SPEAKING PRIVATELY AND NOT FOR THE RECORD, PIERRET SAID THAT HE AND OTHERS NOW IN FACT BELIEVE THAT IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL DRAG OUT INTO THE FALL.

3. SUCH A DELAY, PIERRET ARGUED, IS NOT NECESSARILY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE WEST SINCE TIME PRESSURES ARE IN THIS CASE CLEARLY WORKING AGAINST MOSCOW. SPECIFICALLY, HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES AT THE QUAI BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS VERY MUCH WANT TO WIND UP PHASE TWO IN TIME FOR PROPAGANDA EXPLOITATION IN THE UPCOMING RUSSIAN VE DAY CELEBRATIONS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, BREZHNEV PERSONALLY IS OBVIOUSLY VERY ANXIOUS TO WIND UP PHASE THREE AT A SUMMIT WELL IN TIME TO REPORT ON ITS SUCCESS TO THE 25TH SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS, AN EVENT WHICH COULD SERVE AS HIS VALEDICTORY. ON THIS ASSUMPTION, BREZHNEV WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO WIND UP CSCE NOT LATER THAN EARLY THIS FALL.

4. FOLLOWING THIS ANALYSIS, PIERRET THOUGHT THAT THE WEST COULD WELL AFFORD TO WAIT OUT CURRENT SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

PAGE 03 PARIS 04252 01 OF 02 182104Z

TIATING DELAYS WITH RELATIVE EQUANIMITY, PROVIDED REPEAT PROVIDED THAT THE WESTERN CSCE PARTICIPANTS DO NOT PERMIT THEMSELVES TO GET PANICKED INTO PRECIPITATE AGREEMENTS WHEN AND IF THE SOVIETS DO SURFACE THEIR COMPROMISE PROPOSALS. IN SHORT, QUAI WORKING LEVEL BELIEVES THAT FIRMNESS WILL PAY OFF IN FINAL CSCE PHASE, BUT IS NOT SURE IT CAN BE ACHIEVED.

5. TURNING TO SPECIFIC ISSUES, PIERRET TOLD US THAT
MAIN CSCE PROBLEMS STILL TO BE RESOLVED ARE SOVIET
RESISTANCE ON CBM'S AND PEACEFUL CHANGE, THE PROBLEMS
INVOLVED IN FORMULATING A STATEMENT ON QUADRIPARTITE
RIGHTS AND THE ISSUE OF CSCE FOLLOW-ON. OF THESE
PIERRET FELT THE CBM PROBLEM THE MOST SERIOUS AND
DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY SINCE QUAI IS DETERMINED TO
RESIST ANY CARRY-OVER DISCUSSION OF THESE OR OTHER

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PAGE 01 PARIS 04252 02 OF 02 182116Z

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 04252

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ISSUES BEYOND PRESENT ROUNDS OF CSCE, AND HE WAS NOT SURE BREZHNEV IN FACT HAD THE LATITUDE TO MEET WESTERN DEMANDS. EVEN SO, PIERRET PERSONALLY THOUGHT THAT CONTINUED AND SUCCESSFUL SOVIET BLOCKAGE ON CBM'S, WHILE UNDOUBTEDLY DELAYING PHASE THREE, WOULD NOT NECESSARILY SCUTTLE THE MOMENTUM TOWARD A SUMMIT. HE SPECULATED, STRICTLY OFF THE RECORD, THAT THE FRG MIGHT IN THE END YIELD ON CBM'S, IF IT GOT AN ADEQUATE FORMULATION ON PEACEFUL CHANGE. THE UK, PIERRET SAID SURPRISINGLY, SECRET

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PAGE 02 PARIS 04252 02 OF 02 182116Z

MIGHT ALSO ULTIMATELY TRADE OFF CBM'S FOR A COMPROMISE ON THE FOLLOW-ON ISSUE, IN WHICH IT SEEMED MORE INTERESTED. AS FOR THE FRENCH THEMSELVES, HE THOUGHT THAT, IN THE CRUNCH, THEY WOULD FOLLOW THE REST OF THE EUROPEANS ON THIS QUESTION. WHILE FAILURE ON CBM'S WOULD TAKE THE HEART OUT OF CSCE, THE SHOW THEREFORE WOULD PROBABLY GO ON.

6. ON PEACEFUL CHANGE, PIERRET THOUGHT THE QUAI WOULD CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE FRG'S LEAD, BUT VERY MUCH HOPED TO LEARN WHETHER AND HOW SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH GROMYKO IN GENEVA. AS FOR QUADRIpartite RIGHTS, THE FRENCH HAD AGREED TO MOVING THE QRR TEXT TO THE TENTH PRINCIPLE, BUT STRONGLY FEARED THAT THIS WILL NOT SUFFICE TO SATISFY NEUTRAL OPPOSITION.

7. REGARDING CSCE FOLLOW-ON, PIERRET STRESSED THAT THE FRENCH DO NOT WANT TO MAKE FURTHER COMPROMISES. THEY ARE VERY MUCH AFRAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF SOVIET DEMANDS FOR PERMANENT FOLLOW-ON MECHANISMS IS ONLY TO HAND THEMSELVES AND THE WEST EUROPEAN CP'S A PERMANENT PROPAGANDA DEVICE. (SEE ALSO BONN 2910 ON THIS ISSUE.) FRENCH THEREFORE FEEL THAT DANISH PROPOSAL ALREADY REPRESENTS SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSION AND ARE NOT LIKELY TO MOVE FROM THREE-YEAR TO ONE-YEAR INTERVALS FOR CSCE REVIEW MEETINGS AS SUGGESTED BY UK.

8. REGARDING BASKET III, PIERRET WAS A GOOD DEAL LESS EMPHATIC, SUGGESTING THAT "SOVIETS HAD ALREADY MADE SOME CONCESSIONS." WHILE ADMITTING THAT DIFFICULT PROBLEMS REMAINED, HE EXPECTED ADDITIONAL SOVIET CONCESSIONS IN THIS AREA AND LEFT EMBOFF WITH GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT QUAI DOES NOT CONSIDER BASKET III QUESTIONS AS DIFFICULT TO SETTLE AS OTHERS LISTED ABOVE.

9. COMMENT: EMBASSY NOT YET CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT ABOVE VIEWS ALSO REFLECT CURRENT TOP LEVEL THINKING AT QUAI AND ELYSEE. IF SO, IT WOULD REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT COOL-

ING OF CSCE ENTHUSIASMS EVIDENT HERE AFTER BREZHNEV
SUMMIT, AS A RESULT SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE ON RETURN TO
GENEVA. QUAI ASSESSMENT DOES SUGGEST THAT FRENCH MIGHT
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PAGE 03 PARIS 04252 02 OF 02 182116Z

WELL JOIN IN SOME FIRM POSITIONS IN FINAL "CRUNCH"
PHASES OF CSCE, BUT ARE PREPARED ACCEPT RELATIVELY
INCONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME, IF OTHERS' NERVES FAIL, I.E.,
ON CBM'S.
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